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Medical Secrecy: Some Moral Aspects
]OHN ]. LYNCH, S. J.
AR ECENT SURVEY c o nducted among some hundred Eng­lish and Welsh physicians re­vealed  a marked difference ofopinion regarding the practicalobligations of medical secrecy. 1 The questionnaire submitted tothese doctors took the form of aseries of imaginary cases in whicheither the common good or therights of individuals seemed toargue in favor of a doctor's di­vulging certain information ac­quired in the course of his pro­fessional practice. The doctorswere asked to express their per­sonal opinions as to proper pro­cedure in each instance, whetherto disclose or to withhold the in­formation in question. 
identity of a criminal abortionist,whose name he has learned froma woman patient who forbids himto make use of the knowledge? Asliglit majority favored reportingthe culprit, while a strong minor-ity declared for the contrary. Aworkman is receiving industrialinsurance compensation for an in­jury alleged to have been receivedin the course of his work. Wouldhis personal physician be j ustifledin revealing to authorities that thedisability was actually incurredprior to his employment and thatthe claim is therefore fraudulent?By approximately two to one, thedoctors decided against the pro­priety of· revealing this medicalinformation. 
Some of the problems posed arequite provocative - and perhapsthe divergence of opinions ex:..pressed would be considered evenmore so. If a physician, for ex­ample, as a private practitioner,should discover that a railroad en­gineer, whom he has diagnosed asepileptic, intends neither to informhis employers of his condition norto give up his work, shoµld thedoctor himself report the case torailway authorities? Answers werealmost seven to one in favor ofdivulging the information. Shouldthe doctor report to the police the
l Reported by E. C. Dawson, M.R.C.S .."Duties of A Doctor as A Citizen,"British  Medical Journal, 4902: 1474-1478 (Dec. 18) 1954. 
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The results of such a poll mighteasily provoke doctors to any oneof several adverse reactions -either consternation at the numberwho would countenance an ap­parent breach of professional eth­ks in certain situations; or impa­tience with the insistence of someon the absolute sacredness of themedical secret regardless of allcircumstances; or chagrin at thefailure of doctors to agree on sobasic a question; or perhaps re­sentment towards medical soci­eties whose stringent ethical codesseem to create the dilemmas whichoccasion such u n c e r  t a  i n  t i e s  .Which, if any, is the proper re­action in the light of sound moralprinciples? 
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In its ultimate refinements, the 
moral question of professional 
secrecy is complex to the ext�eme, 
and does not lend itself easily to 
exhaustive treatment within the 
limits of a single article. 2 But 
there is a certain minimum of ba­
sic principles which can be sta�ed 
more or less briefly and which 
may serve to remove at l�ast the 
major doubts which are lik�ly to 
occur in this regard. So, m the 
interests of practicality, these �re 
the principal points upon which 
solution will depend when prob­
lems of medical secrecy present 
themselves: 
1 ) The doctor's obli�ation of 
medical secrecy is a serious duty 
arising from the nautra_l-law right 
of both patient and sooety; 
. 2) The obligation as der_ived 
from natural law is not entirely 
absolute, but admits of so:11e ex­
ceptions in accordance with . the 
rights of both patient and soC1ety; 
3) These exceptions are rela­
tively rare, and usually �t least 
the common good will requi�e that 
a doctor maintain silence with re­
gard to secret knowledge ac­
quired of his patients_ in the course 
of professional practice. 
NATURE OF SECRECY IN 
GENERAL 
Apart from all technicalities, it 
is clear that much of what . we 
know - especially knowledge of 
2 For an excellent and fully detai�ed
t eatment of professional secrecy, 1�­cluding specific applications to th
R
e obh-
ation of doctors, see Robert E. egan,b SA The Moral Principles Govern­
ing ·P;ofessional Secrecy witp an /n; quiry into Some of the More mpor an_ Professional S e c r e t s  (W_ashmgton. Catholic University of America, 1941).
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our own deficiencies in the physi­
cal or moral order-is of a highly 
personal and private n�ture a_nd 
not the sort of information which 
we would care to share with 
others. Fortunately not all of 
those facts are externally appar­
ent to others; the evidence is mer­
cifully concealed to everyone but 
ourselves. For if others were to 
discover our secret, it could cause 
us notable displeasure, discomfort, 
embarrassment, or perhaps even 
·sfortune of a more calamitousml 
. t nature. Hence we take pams. o 
conceal from others informat10,n 
which we consider to be no one s 
business but our own; and we r�­
sent those who pry into our pri­
vate affairs for the satisfaction �f 
their own curiosity. Whether it 
be the size of his bank acc_ount or 
the nature of his secret s1_ns, the 
contents of his diary or �1s m�d­
ical case history, the ordinary in­
dividual is extremely jealous of 
his monopoly on certain kno�l­
edge which he regards as being 
1 ·vely his In other words,exc us1 · . 
one's right to his own sec
d
rets
d 
is 
· d an e-universal.ly recognize 
fended as part of our natural her­
itage. 
It . . that commonly acceptedlS 
h 1 . t concept which the t eo og1ans a -
tempt to delineate even more pr�­
cisely when they define secrets in 
general as any hidden knowled
g_
e, 
. . to a person by stnct pertaining 
t z right, which others may no a':'-
fully seek to possess, use, or dis-
of (i.e., reveal} contrary to 
ri:\easonable will of the owner. 
They, too, consider a secret. to �:
the property of its owner in t_ 
l very same sense in which �atena 
possessions belong exclusively to 
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this or that individual C 
1 
· onse-
��
ent y �nly the owner of a secret 
s the right to possess t 
t h 
, o use, or 
o s are it with whom h 
F h 
e may. 
rt� 
o
� 
ers to usurp that exclusive 
1 
g t is a form of injustice equiva­
e
�
! to the£ t, the seriousness of 
w i�h must be estimated in pro­
portion to the harm which . f 
seen 
1s ore­
. . as consequent upon that 
. -
Justice. 
m 
Granted therefore the 1 occu t 
nature of certain information 
exclusi�e title to it on the pa;t �� 
� �a:ticu�ar individual, and the 
md1v1dual s reasonable unwillin -
ne_ss to share it with others the�e 
a.rises from natural law an �bliga­
tton on the part of all others to 
�
�spect that right just as conscien-
�ous)y as they should respect the 
right of private property. If 
trary t h 
, , con-o anot er s reasonable w'll 
we p . h 
I ' 
. ry mto is secret knowled e or imp�rt it to others or make }f1-
authonzed use of ·t 
h' 
I m any way 
to is disadvantage we d h' · . , o 1m an miustice just as surely as though 
we had_ appropriated his material 
possessions. 
PROFESSIONAL SECRECY 
h 
_The professional secret is all 
. t �s. and considerably more en . ta1l�ng as it does additional' obli= 
gations even more serious than 
those already predicated f 
crets · 
o se­
" . m .. general. Respect for the 
. 
simple s�cr_et ( the term is used 
m contrad1stmction to the 
l 
more 
cor_np ex professional secret) is re-
t
u1
;
_ed �rimarily by commutative
� s _ic_e. i.e., by the rights of the 
mdw1dual whose excl . . . usive posses-sion the mformation is and to 
whose personal detriment viola­
tion of that right would tend. 
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Professional secrecy is demanded 
also by legal justice, i.e., by the 
common good which is at ver 
�
east endangered, if not actuall; 
amaged, by every violation of 
professional trust. It is that . . bl 
mev-
1ta e relationship to the common 
good �f society which marks the 
essential feature of th f . 1 
e pro es-
s�ona secret and reveals its espe­
cially sacred character. 
This relationship arises from 
the fact that certain professions 
altogether indispensable to soci� 
e�y. are of their very nature fidu-
c1a.i: · h . Y, 1.e., t ey necessarily deal with_ the secrets of clients. The 
me?1cal_ profession, for example, 
which is unquestionably essential 
to t�e good health of any com­
mu�1ty, depends to a large extent 
for its effectiveness on the willing­
ness of patients to make available 
to their doctors a good deal of in­
formation of a secret nature. Be­
�ause of the necessity of procur­
mg proper medical care, patients 
have. n_o choice but to entrust their physicians with knowledge about
themselves which otherwise they 
would not dream of d. 1 . 
Th 
!VU gmg. 
. ey. do so on the implicit under­s!andmg that their secrets are en­
tirely safe with doctors and that
their confidence as patients will in 
no way be used to their disad­
vantage. They do not relinquish 
their right to secrecy, but perforce 
allow the doctor to share in the
pos_session of knowledge O v e r
which they alone retain the right
of any further disclosure. 
Now let us suppose an outright
breach of medical secrecy on the
part of a physician. What harm
would thereby be done? There
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would be, of course, a personal 
injustice to the individual patient, 
as would be true in any violation 
of secrecy. But over and above 
this personal injustice, a blow 
would also be struck against the 
integrity of the profession as a 
whole and consequently against 
its future effectiveness for the 
common good. To function at 
i d e a  I maximum efficiency, the 
medical profession simply must 
command the respect and esteem 
of the public and maintain that 
tradition of unquestioned trust­
worthiness which invites the con­
fidences of individual patients. 
Conduct which belies that reputa­
tion cannot fail to have deleterious 
effects on the profession's poten­
tial worth as a service to human­
i�y. It is for this social purpose 
that medical codes of ethics are 
primarily devised. Their principal 
aim is to protect the integrity of 
the profession as such, that the 
public good may be adequately 
served. Professional misconduct, 
therefore, becomes reprehensible 
not only as an offense against the 
individual patient but also as a 
form of perfidy against both the 
profession and the community. 
Such are the several implica­
tions intended by theologians 
when they describe medical se­
crecy as a special obligation, bind­
ing doctors in both commutative
and legal justice, of maintaining a
discreet silence with reference to
the confidential communications
made to them in the course of
their practice. The basic obliga­
tion of the medical secret differs 
in no way from the obligation of 
secrecy in general. and forbids the 
physician to use or to reveal his 
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patients' secrets contrary to their 
reasonable wishes. The source of 
tlie obligation, however, is two­
fold: commutative justice which 
determines the doctor's duty to his 
individual patients; and legal jus­
tice, which fixes his responsibility 
to the medical profession and to 
the public at large. 
No member of the medical pro­
fession, when he functions as 
such, can possibly escape this re­
sponsibility to the individual and 
to the common good. It is simply 
inseparable from his off ice as phy­
sician, and made so by natural
 
law. It is implicit in the tacit con­
tract upon which he enters with
 
his patient when he undertakes to
 
act in the latter's behalf, and
 
would be so even independen
tly 
of any humanly contrived code o
f 
ethics. While it is true that ev
ery 
medical code from the time 
of
Hippocrates has recognized a
nd
sanctioned his rule of professio
nal
secrecy, the fundamental obl
iga­
tion in no way depends upon 
hu­
man legislation. We do wel
l to
reaffirm and specify it by pos
itive
precept.·· just as the Church 
has
often declared other duties of
 nat­
ural -law. But in the last an
alysis
we must face the fact tha
t the
medical secret is sacred no
t by
m e r e  convention or ar
bitrary
agreement among honorab
le men,
but by virtue of that unive
rsal and
immutable law of which n
one less
than God is the author. 3 
3 For further clarification 
of the distinc­
tion to be made between m
edical ethics
in the strict and in the bro
ad sense, see
Fr. Kelly's comments on t
he Interna­
tional Code of Medical Ethics, p. 55 of
this issue of L1NACRE QUAR
TERLY. 
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A LIMITED OBLIGATION 
On the basis of this concept of 
medical secrecy, the obligation it 
entails is to some extent limited 
and not absolute, and may be ex­
pressed in such terms as these: 
the physician is obliged to protect 
his patient's secret as long as the 
patient retains the right to secrecy 
and remains reasonably unwilling 
that its content be divulged, or as
long as the common good, even 
i n dependently o f  the patient's 
right, requires that secrecy be ob­
served. 
This principle affirms the right 
of both patient and society to re­
quire secrecy of doctors. And. 
with the consistency of logic itself. 
i.t also implies that if neither the
patient's right nor the common 
good should demand secrecy in a 
given instance, the obligation in 
that particular case is simply non­
existent. Perhaps the easiest way 
to explain the exceptions implicit 
in the general rule would be to 
consider some of the situations in 
which revelation of a medical se­
cret could be regarded as com­
patible with both the patient's 
rights and the good of society. 
I) Consent of the Patient
a ) Explicit Consent
To begin with the most obvious, 
it- is clear that the patient himself. 
as proprietor of his own secret, 
may authorize its disclosure to 
whomsoever he pleases. Though 
still in possession of his right to 
secrecy, he may simply prefer not 
to exercise it absolutely but to ad­
mit certain others to a share in his 
knowledge. In the event of ex­
plicit authorization of this sort, it 
is hardly necessary to state that 
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no injustice to the patient is done 
by revealing the information in 
question, provided that only as 
much is divulged as has been au­
thorized and only to the parties 
designated. The patient's request. 
for example, that the doctor re­
lease to an insurance company 
whatever part of his medical rec­
ord be necessary for adjustment 
of claims, limits both the recipient 
of the information and the amount 
to be divulged. 
Does the common good make 
any demands of the doctor in 
cases of this kind? It does, at 
least to the extent of requiring 
caution lest a wrong impression 
be given when divulging informa­
tion even with the consent of the 
patient. Especially when dealing 
with laymen, a doctor would be 
wise to let the fact of authoriza­
tion be known to those to whom 
he must disclose his patient's se­
crets. Otherwise there can be 
danger of creating suspicion that 
medical confidences are being vio­
lated, even when actually they 
are not, with resultant discredit 
to the individual doctor and to the 
profession itself. 
( For much the same reason, in­
cidentally. doctors should avoid if 
possil;>le discussing even the non­
secret affairs of their patients, i.e .. 
facts about them which may be 
common knowledge. but which a 
physician might also know in a 
professional capacity. Everyone in 
the neighborhood may know. for 
instance, about the birth of an il­
legitimate child. But to have that 
knowledge confirmed by the at­
tending obstetrician would not be 
the sort of conduct which does 
credit to the medical profession.) 
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b) Presumed Consent
It cannot be denied that cir­
cumstances can arise in which the 
patient's willingness to admit cer­
tain others to his secrets may be 
legitimately presumed. If for any 
reason it is impossible to contact 
the patient in circumstances which 
seem to demand some disclosure 
of professional knowledge. and if 
it can be prudently judged that 
authorization would be readily 
granted if the request could be 
made. then presumption of con­
sent could be in order. Certainly. 
for example, no doctor would hes­
itate to call medical .consultants 
into a case in which an unknown 
patient is unconscious and consul_­
tation advisable. And because 1t
is only reasonable to suppose th�t
patients are concerned for their
spiritual welfare, it is also a safe
presumption that they are not un­
willing that the chaplain be s�p­
plied with whatever information
may be necessary to his proper
function in their regard. 
Perhaps a practical test for the 
validity of such a presumption
would be some such question as
this: is disclosure of this informa­
tion so obviously to the patient's
benefit that he would readily au­
thorize it if he were able? But
unless that question can be an­
swered with prudent assurance in
the affirmative, presumption of
consent in this matter can be risky
business and should be restricted
to that absolute minimum which
only real necessity requires. 
2) Cessation of the
Patient's Right
When we speak in terms of the
right to complete secrecy. we im-
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ply that one is justified in exclu�­
ing all others from any share m 
the knowledge he claims as secret. 
Now it can happen that others 
besides the patient can acquire le­
gitimate title to the kn�wledge
which comprises the medical se­
cret. and can justly demand that 
they be a 11 o w e  d their rightf �l 
share in that knowledge. Or 1t 
can h a p p e n  that some higher 
moral duty of the patient towards 
himself may require at least par­
tial revelation of his secret. If 
either possibility should eventu­
ate ( and how it might event�a�e
will be illustrated shortly). 1t 1s 
clear that no injustice is done the
patient if a secret, which i.n c�n­
science he should share with
others, is actually communicated
to those legitimate claimants. That
is why the doctor's obligati.on was
conditioned previously with the
proviso, "as long as the P.atient
retains his right to secrecy. 
However, even though there
may be others to whom a �edical
secret should be divulged, it does
not immediately follow that the
physician should be the . one to 
make the disclosure. Society and
his profession also have further
claims on his silence. For unless
we restrict to the barest possible 
minimum even those disclosures
which do no violence to the rights
of individual patients, inevitably
there will result a damaging loss
of public confidenc� in. and .r�spect
for the essential mv1olab1�1ty of
professional trust. Primanly f�r
that reason, the common good will
usually require that the doctor
maintain secrecy even after the
patient's strict right may have
lapsed. And that is the reason.
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too, for including within our gen­
eral principle the phrase, "as long 
as the common good, even inde­
pendently of the patient's right, 
requires that s e c r e c y  be ob­
served." Translated into medical 
terminology, it means that dis­
closure of professional knowledge 
should be for the doctor a pro­
cedure of last resort. 
But to return to cases, what 
circumstances could deprive the 
patient of his personal right to 
complete secrecy? The generic an­
swer is "conflict"; more specifically, 
conflict either with a higher obli­
gation on his own part or with a 
predominant right on the part of 
others. The following break-down 
of possibilities perhaps will serve 
to illustrate the type of limitation 
which must be put on the patient's 
right to complete secrecy. 
a) Con[ licting Obligation
of the Patient
There are times when a pa­
tient's refusal to allow medical se­
crets to be divulged to certain 
others will do him more harm than 
good, and when insistence on se­
crecy may appear to conflict with 
more important rights and obliga­
tions of his own. It may happen, 
for example, that if a needy pa­
tient would only inform a wealthy 
relative of his need of some ex­
pensive treatment, death might be 
averted. Still the patient refuses 
to reveal his plight, and the doc­
tor may wonder whether for the 
stubborn one's own good he him­
self should contact the relative in 
guestion. 
"As long as the patient retains 
his right to secrecy, the doctor 
must respect that right." And 
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from the sole fact that his secret 
will do him more physical harrr 
than good, it does not necessaril) 
follow that the right of secreC) 
lapses. Only if the harm whicf­
would result is one which he i., 
obliged to avert even at some sac. 
rifice of secrecy, will his right tc. 
that degree of privacy be nullified 
What appears to be, according tc
human standards, "the sensibk 
thing to do" is not always of ob­
ligation. 
But take for example the fallen­
away Catholic who is in seriouf 
danger of death from some ail­
ment not apparent to the unpro­
fessional eye and who has falsi­
fied his religion upon admission to 
the hospital. He forbids the doc­
tor to inform the Catholic chap­
lain either of his physical condi­
tion or of his religious status. 
Clearly this insistence on the right 
to secrecy is unfounded, since it 
is in direct conflict with the pa­
tient's higher right and obligation 
to save his soul. Actually he does 
not possess the right to that de­
gree of secrecy, if the revelation 
of those two facts represents his 
only practical chance for salvation. 
Certainly in this extreme case no 
right of the patient is violated if 
this profess ional  knowledge i s  
made available to the chaplain; 
and, if it is not likely that the lat­
ter will acquire the information 
elsewhere, the doctor would be 
justified in supplying it. 
Perhaps  the example is so 
strained as to appear worthless. 
The choice was deliberate because 
of a personal conviction that in a 
conflict of this kind it is seldom 
easy to decide with certainty that 
the right to secrecy must yield. 
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Even more seldom would it be the 
prerogative of the doctor to solve 
such doubts contrary to the pa­
tient's own decision. The case cited 
above is, I think, clearly one on 
which right to secrecy must yield; 
but it is one of comparatively few. 
b) Con{Ucting Rights of the
Doctor 
Even in the face of his obligation 
to respect the medical secret as 
being the property of another, the 
physician himself possesses certain 
inviolable rights to reputation and 
to· the pursuit of his material and 
spiritual welfare. To what extent 
must he sacr ific e  any of t hese 
rights in order to protect a medical 
secret? Or is he justified in pro­
tecting his own legitimate interests 
even at the cost, if necessary, of 
r�veal in g certain prof essional 
knowledge? 
In at least one such contingency, 
it. is clear that it is the patient's 
right which yields and the doctor's 
which prevails. The case is one in 
which the medical secret is abused 
by being deliberately employed as 
a weapon of unjust aggression 
against the doctor himself. Instead 
of employing his doctor's silence 
as a means of protecting his own 
legitimate interests ( the only pur­
pose for which the right to secrecy 
is granted him), the patient now 
threatens to make use of that si­
lence in an unjust invasion of ·the 
physician's rights. 
Suppose, for example, that a pa­
tient were maliciously to bring un­
warranted suit for malpractice 
against an innocent physician. The 
latter's only defense, we can fur­
ther suppose, against financial loss 
and defamation of character is the 
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testimony of his medical records of 
the case. According to the prin­
ciple of legi t i m a t e  self-defense 
against unjust a g g ression, t h e  
plaintiff has sacrificed his right to 
secrecy by making it an instrument 
of injustice, and the doctor may, 
in proportion to the gravity of the 
danger which threatens him, make 
whatever use  of profession a l  
knowledge may b e  truly necessary 
to defend himself. 
Legally the case is more simply 
solved. Unless I am mistaken, no 
plaintiff would be allowed to insti­
gate such a suit unless he waived 
the right to secrecy in.what consti­
tutes pertinent evidence. Thus the 
solution is again based on q:msent 
of the patient. But the moral justi­
fication of such a legal ruling can 
be found in this principle of the 
right to defend oneself against un­
just attack. 
Theoretically it may also happen 
that through no fault of the patient 
the medical secret becomes a seri­
ous threat to the doctor. The 
classic example is that of a doctor 
who is himself accused of a crime 
which from professional knowledge 
he knows was committed by his 
patient. The latter, according to 
the further supposition, is in no 
way responsible for suspicion hav­
ing fallen on the innocent doctor, 
and hence cannot be classified as 
an unjust aggressor in his regard. 
Such a contingency, though pos­
sible, does not seem to be a highly
pract ical  p r o b a b il ity. Perhaps,
however, a case in point is created
by the failure of our com�on law
to recognize in court the privileged
nature of the medical secret. Sup­
pose, for example, that a civil court
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shquld subpoena a physician to 
testify from his records against a 
criminal abortionist. Say what we 
may about the defectiveness of a 
civil law which creates such dilem­
mas, the fact remains that, justly 
or unjustly, the doctor could be 
prosecuted in many of our states 
and severely penalized for refusal 
so to testify. Must he in conscience 
submit to such a penalty rather 
than reveal professional  knowl­
edge? 
On condition that the danger 
threatening him can be appraised 
as truly serious, and that the doc­
tor can avoid it in no other practi­
cal way, his testimony from the 
medical record would be morally 
permissible. He should have the 
court record show that he considers 
his knowledge privileged; and he 
should conceal, if poss ible , the 
identity of the patient. Beyond that 
point he is not obliged to go. The 
reasons in order are these: 1 ) the 
doctor-patient contract cannot be 
said to be undertaken with intent 
to bind even with serious harm to 
the physician, and hence does not 
certainly oblige from justice at that 
cost to him; 2) charity does not 
require that one protect another at 
the serious risk of equivalently the 
same harm to self; 3) since in the 
circumstances it should be clear to 
all that the doctor testifies only 
under protest and because of the 
alleged requirements of the com­
mon good, neither his own reputa­
tion nor that of the profess ion 
should reasonably suffer in  public 
estimation .. 
The solution is not an ideal one, 
chiefly because the anomaly of our 
civil law makes ideal solution im­
possible. But perhaps it may pro-
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vide some measure of assuranc( 
for doctors who must face the di 
lemma. 
c) Confl.icting Rights of Others
We have said that a doctor ir
sometimes justified ( at the sacri 
flee of secrecy, if necessary) iI 
protecting himself against a pa 
tient' s misuse of the secret as ;: 
weapon of unjust aggression. S 
too, he may at times protect othe_ 
individuals or society as such ir 
t�� same way. What we may le
g1timately do for ourselves in thii 
regard we may in charity do fo: 
others. 
The traditional example cited in 
this connection is that of the pa 
tient with a contagious and not 
readily curable disease who is con­
templating marriage and who re­
fuses to inform his fiancee of hi� 
physical condition. Clearly the pa­
tient is not justified in concealino 
the fact from his wife-to-be, and 
his silence is a serious threat to 
her physical welfare. May the 
physician make the info r m at ion 
available to  her? 
He should first make all reason­
able effort to persuade the patient 
either to postpone the marriage un­
til cured or to inform his fiancee 
of his condition. Failing that, he 
would be justified in communicat­
ing that professional knowledge to 
the one interested party, if there is 
no likelihood that she would ac-· 
quire the information from some 
other source or otherwise be pro­
tected from the danger which 
threatens her. 
d) Confl.icting Rights of Society
What can be said about the
conflicting rights of other individ-
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uals applies a fortiori to the rights
of society. This conflict is well
illustrated by one of the cases in­
cluded in the survey ref erred to at
the beginning of this discussion­
that of the epileptic engineer. In
refusing either to quit his work or
to inform railway officials of his
incapacity, this patient is using
secrecy  unjust ly  as a weapon
against the public at large. The
common good demands protection
against his unjust aggression. If
the only practical means of provid­
ing that protection is revelation of
professional knowledge, the doctor
is within his moral rights in dis­
closing the dangerous fact to the
proper auth ori ty .  On the very
same principle we would justify
without hesitation the reporting of
cpntagious diseases to the extent
necessary to insure proper quaran­
tine. 
It is when the common good is
seriously imperilled in this way
that release from the obligation is
least difficult, though still far from
easy, to vindicate. The reason is
that if the common good would
suffer notably more from secrecy
than it would from disclosure, so­
ciety is considered as preferring
the lesser evil and as thereby waiv­
ing the claim which in legal justice
it has to the preservation of secre­
cy. In all other cases, however,
that perennial claim of the common
good argues more strongly against
a n y  disclosure of professional
knowledge. 
RIGHT VS. OBLIGATION
Besides the problem of the right
to. divulge medical secrets, mora­
lists also consider the question of 
obligation at times to make such a 
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disclosure. I have deliberately re­
stricted this discussion to the ques­
tion of right and have avoided all
reference to any obligation. My
reason for doing so is not a con­
tention that obl i gat ion in these
cases can never be verified. Rather
it is a conviction that very rarely
in medical practice will a doctor
encounter a situation in which, be­
yond shadow of all  legit imate
doubt, he must under pain of sin
reveal professional knowledge.
And until all reasonable doubt to
the contrary is dispelled, no one is
justified in insisting that a medical
secret must be revealed. Moral per­
missibility ( "may do'') is consist­
ent with legitimate differences of
theological opinion; but moral ob­
ligation ("must do") is not. In
this particular matter there are too
many imponderables to make it
frequently possible in practice to
exclude all legitimate doubt. There­
fore, in what is meant to be a pre­
dominantly practical discussion, I
pref er to transmit the question of
obligation as it affects disclosures.
If doctors ever should encounter a
case in which they feel conscience­
bound and yet reluctant to reveal
a medical secret, they .would do
well to propose their problem to a
c ompetent the ologian and be
guided by his considered opinion.
The basic reason behind this
caution is again the fact that the
common good is ultra-sensitive t
o
any revelation of professional se
­
crets. Even legitimate disclosures
have to be regretted to some ex
­
tent, because t ogether  with th
e
good which they accomplish the
re
is always the danger that the in
­
tegrity of the profession will suff
er
in public estimation. Unless  the
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good to be achieved is proportion­ate to concomitant harmful effects,and unl ess n o  other p ract i calmeans is available to attain thatnecessary good, secrecy shouldbe maintained. As difficult as it isto cite practical cases in which adoctor would be permitted to re­veal a medical secret, it is immeas­urably more difficult to prove in­stances in which he is certainlyobliged to make such a revelation.
tient is clearly making an unjust 
claim under the terms of his policy. 
But the company has or had at its 
disposal, and apparently failed to 
use, a very ordinary and acceptable 
means of protecting itself against 
such an eventuality, viz., medical 
examination by its own physician 
prior to issuing the policy. The 
patient's personal physician has no 
obligation to the insurance com­
pany in these circumstances. If by 
his silence an injustice is made 
possible, it is one which, as far as 
the doctor is concerned, he permits 
because of a higher necessity and 
does not directly intend. And that 
injustice which is allowed does not 
seem comparable in significance to 
the harm which would be inflicted 
on the whole profession and on the 
common good if this type of reve­
lation were general1y permitted. 
THE SURVEY CASESOn the basis of all that has pre­ceded, my own opinion on the twoother cases proposed to the Englishand Welsh doctors would favorthe physician's maintaining secrecy in both. The most to be achieved·if the doctor reports the abortion­ist is the possible apprehension andprosecution of one criminal, butunfortunately not the extirpationof the criminal practice. And ifconviction should depend primari­ly on the doctor's evidence, thechances of effecting even that re­sult are poor, since he can provideonly hearsay evidence from a hos­tile witness. If the doctor ideiitifieshis patient in order that she beforced to testify, ·he is violating herright to reputation, which is stillextant despite her moral guilt inprocuring abortion. It seems to methat too little good and too muchharm would actually result fromrevelation in this case, and that thedoctor is still obliged to secrecy.In the insurance case, 4 the pa-
t As.proposed to the British physicians,the case presents the State as the in­suring agent. In order to make the problem more practical for Americandoctors, I am assuming a situation morecommon in this country and supposinga case in which private industry makesits own provisions for employee acci­dent insurance. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Natural law obliges the doctor 
to silence with regard to the secrets 
in which he shares by virtue of his 
professional ca11ing. This grave 
obligation derives from both com­
mutative justice ( which determines 
the rights of individual patients) 
and f rom legal  jus t i ce  (which 
specifies the right which society 
exercises over the silence of doc­
tors). Because the rights of pa­
tients in this regard are not un­
limited,· and because the common 
good can at times be adequately 
served only by some disclosure of 
the medical secret, the natural law 
obligation of medical secrecy is not 
absolute and does admit of legiti­
mate exception. By the very nature 
of things, these exceptions should 
in the practical order be most rare, 
LINACRE QUARTERLY 
and require most careful consid­
eration in each individual case. 
things which I hear in confession 
than I know of those t�ings about 
l . h I know nothing. If not the It was in reference to an e�en more sacred secrecy ( one which 
admits of no conceivable exce�­tion) that St. Augustine had this 
w 11C . ·1 l then one quite s1m1 ar same ru e, 
"I know less about the to say: 
should characterize the doctor .shabitual attitude towards the medi­
cal secret. 
Creditable Record · · · · · 
d , , he United States and Cana a C tholic hospitals and allied ag encies ,n t a 
. , f some 200 per cent in forty years, t t I I 50 I representing an increase o now o a , 
5 b · ts with a total of 214,015 beds and 29,0 I ass
,
n
C
e 
t
,
h 
1· hospitals and allied . th are 1,141 a o1c , 'I At t
he present time, ere 
b d d 23 121 bass, nets; wh, e 'th 147 577 e s an agencies in the United S+a.tes. w1. 
'·th 66 018 beds and 5,894 bassinets
. 
C anada b oasts 360 such ,nst1tut 1ons w
, ' . . 1 954 in U.S. hospitals f t ared for during . The total number of pa , en s c. 
d b 
. 
C anadian institutions 69 and an estimate num er '" 
. 
is reported as 8,093,6 . 
I d ·n and out patients. of 2,250,0 00. The total of I 0,343,608 ,n
c u es ' 
MAY, 1955 
. l p -1955 Directory . . Hosp1ta rogress 
C h lie Hospital Association)(Official Journal of -r:he at o 
73 
